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Should Voir Dire Become Voir Google?
Ethical Implications of Researching
Jurors on Social Media
John G. Browning*
It is a scene played out in countless courtrooms every week. In civil and
criminal cases, attorneys on both sides probe with their questions during voir
dire, seeking to learn more about the prospective jurors and whether or not
they might be likely to align with that lawyer's side of the case, or whether or
not the jurors might have a pre-existing bias on a particular issue. Everything
from a panelist's body language during questioning to her television viewing
habits translates into more data to be factored into the jury selection process.'
And while most cases don't feature the lengthy, detailed questionnaires used
in high-profile or complex litigation, the importance of weeding out the
"wrong" jurors and seating the "right" jurors has spawned an effort to find
out as much about potential jurors as possible and driven the growth of fields
like jury consulting.2 However, thanks to the internet and the explosive
growth of social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter, lawyers and
litigants now have a digital treasure trove of information right at their finger-
tips accessible with the speed of a research engine.3 Welcome to jury selec-
tion in the Digital Age, where, with a few mouse clicks, an attorney can learn
all about a prospective juror-her taste in movies and music, her political
affiliations, education, hobbies, and literally her "likes" and dislikes. But
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3. Linkedln Search in Spotlight at Bank of America Trial, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27,
2013, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/09/27/linkedin-search-in-spot
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where are the ethical boundary lines drawn for attorneys engaged in such
online investigations?
This article will examine the ethical considerations for lawyers ponder-
ing whether to "Facebook the jury," and will discuss not only ethics opin-
ions, but also cases from around the country that have weighed in on this
issue. It will also discuss some of the leading reasons why attorneys would
want to conduct such online juror research, as well as the potential dangers
for attorneys in doing so. As voir dire increasingly incorporates "voir
Google," knowing the risks and rewards of such research becomes vital for
any trial lawyer.
I. Tim DANGERS OF CONDUCTING ONLINE INVESTIGATIONS OF JURORS
The most obvious reason that online investigation of jurors can be dan-
gerous is that no trial lawyer wants to alienate a juror or prospective juror by
appearing invasive or disrespectful of that individual's privacy. In the high-
profile 2013 "Hustle" mortgage fraud trial in the Southern District of New
York, for example, a juror notified the judge when he received an automatic
notification from LinkedIn that a junior member of one of the defense teams
had viewed his profile on that social media networking site.4 Although there
were no sanctions dispensed, this incident no doubt made for some uncom-
fortable moments for that lawyer.5
Courts and legislators also have concerns about the privacy of a juror's
social networking profile. In Michigan, one federal judge concluded that
there is no recognized right to monitor jurors' use of social media, opining
that such efforts by lawyers could intrude on the "safety, privacy, and protec-
tion against harassment" to which jurors are entitled, and "unnecessarily
chill" the willingness of jurors to participate in the democratic system of
justice.6 In the penalty phase of the high-profile Jodi Arias murder trial in
Arizona in December 2013, the presiding judge denied the defense's motion
to order jurors to reveal Twitter account information, ruling that juror privacy
concerns outweighed the defense's desire to monitor jurors to discover if any
were communicating about the case on Twitter.7 And in February 2014, Cali-
fornia became the first state in the country to introduce legislation that would
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. United States v. Kilpatrick, No. 10-20403, 2012 WL 3237147, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 7, 2012) (rejecting the arguments made against the empanelling of
an anonymous jury, since an anonymous jury would prevent the lawyers from
monitoring the jurors' use of social media during the trial in order to determine
if the jurors were engaging in online misconduct).
7. Steve Stout, Judge Denies Arias Motion for Change of Venue, Jurors' Twitter
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safeguard a juror's social media username and password.8 A.B. 2070, intro-
duced by State Representative Nora Campos, would prohibit a court from
revealing or requesting a juror or prospective juror to disclose a username or
password "for the purpose of accessing personal social media," or requiring
the juror or prospective juror to access personal social media "in the presence
of the judge, counsel for either party, or any other officer of the court."9
Another potential danger for attorneys "Facebooking the jury" can stem from
what the attorney does with that information. For example, an assistant dis-
trict attorney in Texas was recently fired for allegedly making "racially in-
sensitive remarks" after his Facebook research led him to exercise a
peremptory strike of an African-American woman on the panel-a strike that
resulted in a Batson proceeding.O During jury selection for the robbery trial
of convicted murderer Darius Lovings, assistant D.A. Steve Brand struck the
panelist because she had been vocal in her desire to be on the jury and be-
cause his Facebook research revealed that she was a member of the NAACP
and had posted on her Facebook page a comment and link referring to the
"Negro Motorist Green Book" (a travel guide for African-Americans during
the Jim Crow era)."I Brand argued that the prospective juror "appeared to be
an activist."12 The judge did not agree that this was a race-neutral reason for
striking the juror, and sustained defense counsel's Batson challenge.13
II. DANGERS OF NOT CONDUCTING ONLINE JUROR RESEARCH
While the dangers of inadvertent contact with jurors, violating juror pri-
vacy, and risking revelations of an improper basis for peremptory strikes are
genuine, they are outweighed by the dangers of not conducting online re-
search.'4 The first obvious danger is the very real threat of jurors risking a
mistrial or overturned verdict due to their own online misconduct.15 The legal
landscape is littered with the many instances in which the hard work of a
judge, lawyers, and other jurors has been undone by the actions of a single
juror who has taken it upon himself to venture online and "research" the
issues, parties, and even evidence in a case, or to communicate with third
parties (sometimes even one of the litigants themselves) about the case. 16 In
2011, the Arkansas Supreme Court overturned a capital murder conviction
8. A.B. 2070, 2013-14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
9. Id.
10. Jasmine Ulloa & Tony Plohetski, District Attorney Lehmberg Fires Key Law-
yer in Her Office, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 12, 2014, at Al.
!1. Id. at A9.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., State v. Abdi, 191 Vt. 162, 174-75 (2012).
15. See, e.g., id.
16. See, e.g., id.
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because of a juror's tweets from the jury box. 17 In 2012, the Vermont Su-
preme Court set aside a child sexual assault conviction after the revelation
that a juror had gone online to research the cultural significance of the al-
leged crime in the Bantu culture of the Somali defendant.,8 Jurors have
posted on Facebook about their deliberations, sent "friend" requests to par-
ties, and even courted mistrials by communicating with a party on the social
networking site.19 Equally disturbing is the very real possibility that-despite
being warned not to engage in such online misconduct by the judge-some
jurors may nevertheless do so and even lie about their actions.20 With the
palpable threat of online juror monitor misconduct, attorneys who choose not
to research or monitor jurors online risk never learning of such misconduct in
the first place. The result is a disservice to their clients and to the administra-
tion of justice.
Besides not learning of actual online misconduct, another potential con-
sequence for lawyers who pass up online juror research is the danger of seat-
ing a juror who has lied about significant information bearing on her
suitability as a juror, such as her litigation history or her opinions about is-
sues central to this case.21 For example, in 2011, a prospective Oklahoma
juror was questioned during voir dire in the murder trial of Jerome Ersland, a
pharmacist who allegedly shot a would-be robber five times while the thief
lay wounded and motionless on the floor2 The panelist was asked if she had
previously expressed any opinion on the case, and she replied no.23 The de-
fense then discovered a Facebook post she had made six months before trial,
which read: "First hell yeah he needs to do sometime [sic]!! The young fella
[sic] was already dead from the gunshot wound to the head, then he came
back with a different [sic] gun and shot him 5 more times. Come on let's be
for real it didn't make no [sic] sense!"24 The panelist (who claimed to have
forgotten making the comments in question) was dismissed from the jury
17. Dimas-Martinez v. State, 385 S.W.3d 238, 248-49 (Ark. 2011).
18. Abdi, 191 Vt. at 174-75.
19. See, e.g., State v. Dellinger, 696 S.E.2d 38, 40, 44 (W. Va. 2010).
20. For example, in one recent Florida case, juror Andrew Sutton made comments
on his Facebook page that reflected disdain for jury service and arguably
demonstrated bias, and then compounded the wrongdoing by lying to the judge
about it, resulting in contempt charges. See Jane Musgrave, Palm Beach
County Juror Removed in Handcuffs, Faces Contempt Charge Over Facebook
Posting, THE PALM BEACH POST (June 2, 2014), http://www.mypalmbeachpost.
com/news/news/crime-law/local-juror-removed-in-handcuffs.
21. See id.
22. Jeffrey T. Frederick, Did I Say That? Another Reason to Do Online Checks on
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pool, found in contempt, and sentenced to one hundred hours of community
service.25
Indeed, juror dishonesty during voir dire, and its consequences for all
involved in the justice system, is an issue commanding increasing attention.
In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Warger v. Shauers, in
which the central issue was whether Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) (the
juror anti-impeachment rule) permits a party moving for a new trial based on
juror dishonesty during voir dire to introduce juror testimony about state-
ments made during deliberations that tend to show the alleged dishonesty.26
And recently, a judge in Florida proposed that online searches of jurors'
backgrounds be required so that trial lawyers can bring any withheld infor-
mation to the court's attention before the start of actual trial.27 Pinellas Cir-
cuit Judge Anthony Rondolino made the comments while denying a motion
for new trial in the case of an eighty four year old woman who fell and died
in the stairwell of an assisted living facility.28 The woman's estate sought
fifteen million dollars, only to have a six-person jury find no negligence on
the part of the facility.29 After trial, the plaintiff's lawyers did online research
and found that all six jurors had failed to disclose their own civil litigation
history. 30 Collectively, this included three bankruptcies, two foreclosures, an
eviction, a child support action, a paternity suit, five domestic violence cases,
a declaratory judgment, an appeal, and a contract lawsuit.3' Observing that
there was "plenty of time to gather the information" during the two week trial
(including a three day period when the court was recessed), Judge Rondolino
proposed that lawyers be required to conduct online research and raise any
objections after jury selection, but before trial.32 Such a process would avoid
handing lawyers a "gotcha card" in which they could wait and see how the
25. Id.
26. Warger v. Shauers, 721 F.3d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 134 S. Ct.
1491 (2014). The Court held that a party seeking a new trial cannot use a
federal juror's comments during deliberations to demonstrate that she lied
about her ability to be fair during voir dire.
27. Stephen Nohlgren, Pinellas Judge: New Process May Be Needed to Screen
Jurors, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 8, 2014), http://www.tampabay.com/news/
courts/civil/pinellas-judge-new-process-may-be-needed-to-screen-jurors/2187




31. Stephen Nohlgren, Jurors Who Didn't Reveal Personal Legal History Could
Cause New Trial in Pinellas Assisted Living Facility Death, TAMPA BAY TIMES
(Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/civil/jurors-who-didnt-
reveal-personal-legal-history-could-cause-new-trial-in/2 160715.
32. Nohlgren, Pinellas Judge, supra note 27.
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verdict turned out before choosing to come forward with the results of online
research.33
Perhaps no case demonstrates both the potential risks of not "Facebook-
ing the jury" and the uncertainty displayed by courts about the issue of al-
lowing such online investigation quite like Sluss v. Commonwealth of
Kentucky.34 In Sluss, appellant Ross Brandon Sluss had been convicted of
(among other charges) murder and driving under the influence of intoxicants
after crashing his pickup truck into a SUV with several passengers. 35 One of
the passengers, eleven year old Destiny Brewer, died.36 The tragedy and en-
suing criminal case garnered tremendous publicity, including extensive dis-
cussion online on sites like Facebook and Topix.37 The trial court, sensitive
to the amount of attention the case had received, engaged in extensive voir
dire procedures. 38
After his conviction, Sluss sought a new trial based on juror misconduct,
arguing that two jurors, Virginia Matthews and jury foreperson Amy Spark-
man-Haney, were Facebook "friends" of the victim's mother, April Brewer. 39
During voir dire, both Matthews and Sparkman-Haney had been silent when
the jurors were asked if they knew the victim or any of the victim's family.40
Moreover, during individual voir dire, Matthews replied unequivocally that
she was not on Facebook and though Sparkman-Haney acknowledged having
a Facebook account and being vaguely aware that "something" had been set
up in the victim's name, she did not share anything beyond that.41
While the court analyzed the nature of Facebook "friend" status and
ultimately held that that fact alone would be insufficient grounds for a new
trial,42 it was clearly more troubled by the jurors' misstatements during voir
dire, especially since it was unknown "to what extent the victim's mother and
the jurors had actually communicated, or the scope of any actual relationship
they may have had."43 In what it acknowledged was "the first time that the
court has been asked to address counsel's investigation of jurors by use of
social media," the Kentucky Supreme Court then turned to whether or not the
33. See id.
34. Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215 (Ky. 2012).
35. Id. at 217.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 221.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 222.
40. Sluss, 381 S.W.3d at 221.
41. Id. at 222.
42. Id. at 223.
43. Id. at 223-24.
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defense counsel should have discovered the online evidence of juror miscon-
duct prior to the verdict.44
The Court ultimately held that there was juror misconduct that war-
ranted, at minimum, a hearing to determine the nature and extent of the
Facebook conduct, if not an actual new trial.n5 It also excused the attorney's
failure to discover the misconduct earlier, since the jurors' answers during
voir dire had given him "little reason to think he needed to investigate a
juror's Facebook account or that he could have even done so ethically given
the state of the law at the time of trial."46 But the Court did go on to an
extensive discussion of the ethical parameters surrounding counsel's investi-
gation of jurors on social media sites, referencing with approval the position
advocated by the New York County Bar Association Ethics Committee.47
Although it conceded that "the practice of conducting intensive internet vet-
ting of potential jurors is becoming more commonplace," the Court declined
to go as far as the Missouri Supreme Court and impose an affirmative duty
on attorneys to do so. 48 The Court observed that while much of the informa-
tion being sought "is likely public," "a reasonable attorney without guidance
may not think this investigatory tactic appropriate, and it is still such a new
line of inquiry that many attorneys who themselves are not yet savvy about
social media may never even have thought of such inquiry."49
The following year, the Supreme Court of Kentucky had the opportunity
to revisit the issue of jurors being less than forthcoming during voir dire
about Facebook relationships and the consequences of an attorney's belated
discovery of such connections.5O In McGaha v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Jeffrey McGaha appealed his conviction for murder, citing among other
grounds the fact that a juror had failed to disclose during voir dire that she
was Facebook "friends" with the victim's wife.51 "Juror 234," as the opinion
refers to her, was directly asked if she was related to anyone involved in the
case. 52 She acknowledged knowing some of the victim's family, "not close,
but I do know them," and described any relationship as "casual."53 As the
court pointed out, "No one asked Juror 234 about any social media relation-
ship she may have with any of the participants in the case," she was "not
44. Id. at 226.
45. Id. at 228-29.
46. Sluss, 381 S.W.3d at 226.
47. Id. at 227-28.
48. Id. at 227.
49. Id.
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challenged for cause by either side, and she was eventually seated on the jury
to try the case." 54 It was only after trial that McGaha learned that the victim's
wife, Charlene Cowan, was one of Juror 234's 629 Facebook "friends."55
In denying McGaha's appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky hear-
kened back to its earlier opinion in Sluss, saying that Facebook "friendships"
do not carry the same weight as live friendships or relationships in the com-
munity.56 Moreover, the fact that this juror had 629 "friends" makes it even
less likely that she could have had a "disqualifying relationship with each
one of them."57 Importantly, the court found Juror 234's answers to questions
during voir dire to be both responsive and truthful, saying that there was no
indication that she was attempting to be deceptive or attempting to conceal
the social media relationship.58 The court pointed out that counsel could have
delved deeper "to discover the depth and scope of her acquaintances within
the Cowan family," but declined to do So.59 So, while it stopped short of
requiring that lawyers research the jury panel's social media presence in
Sluss, in McGaha, the Kentucky Supreme Court seems to say that while it
may behoove an attorney to do so, it won't necessarily result in game-chang-
ing findings.60
III. CASES UPHOLDING THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO RESEARCH JURORS
ONLINE
A. Carino v. Muenzen
In this New Jersey medical malpractice case, the appellate court consid-
ered the plaintiff attorney's request for a new trial after the lawyer had been
prevented by the trial judge from conducting online research on the venire
panel.61 As jury selection began on May 14, 2009, defense counsel objected
when he noticed his adversary accessing the internet on his laptop.62 After
acknowledging to the court that he was Googling the potential jurors and
pointing out "we've done it all the time, everyone does it. It's not unusual,"
the plaintiff attorney was stunned when the court refused to allow it.63 The
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id.





61. Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071, at *7, *9 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2010).
62. Id. at *4.
63. Id.
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trial judge felt that allowing such juror research would jeopardize maintain-
ing "a fair and even playing field."64
Although the appellate court affirmed the defense verdict on other
grounds, it explicitly recognized the right to use the internet to investigate
potential jurors during voir dire, and concluded that the trial judge had acted
unreasonably in preventing use of the internet by plaintiffs counsel.65 The
court held:
There was no suggestion that counsel's use of the computer was in
any way disruptive. That he had the foresight to bring his laptop
computer to court, and defense counsel did not, simply cannot
serve as a basis for judicial intervention in the name of "fairness"
or maintaining "a level playing field." The "playing field" was, in
fact, already "level" because Internet access was open to both
counsel, even if only one of them chose to utilize it.66
B. Burden v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
In this federal court personal injury case, the defense appealed the unfa-
vorable verdict on the grounds of its post-trial internet research into two ju-
rors who had failed to disclose material injuries and lawsuits involving
themselves and relatives in response to questions posed in a juror question-
naire and voir dire.67 The online research was performed using public records
databases to get information that included lawsuits filed.68 The court rejected
the defense's argument of recently-discovered evidence of juror bias, finding
instead that "defendant waived its present objections because the basis of the
objections might have been known or discovered through the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence."69 In other words, no new trial was warranted because
online resources were widely available to the defense long before the actual
verdict, and the defense had an obligation to explore them.70
C. Johnson v. McCullough
In 2010, the Missouri Supreme Court came up with a new standard in
providing competent representation in the digital age-the duty to conduct
64. Id.
65. Id. at *10.
66. Id.
67. Burden v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 08-cv-04-DRH, 2011 WL 3793664, at *1
(S.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2011).
68. Id. at *6-8.
69. Id. at *10.
70. See id.
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online research during the voir dire process. 71 During the voir dire phase of a
medical malpractice trial, plaintiff's counsel inquired about whether anyone
on the venire panel had ever been a party to a lawsuit.72 While several mem-
bers of the panel were forthcoming, one prospective juror, Mims, did not
disclose that she had been a party to litigation, and was selected as a jury
member.73 Following a defense verdict, plaintiff's counsel researched Mims
on Missouri's PACER-like online database, Case.net, and learned of multiple
previous lawsuits involving the juror.74 The trial court granted a motion for
new trial based on Mims' intentional concealment of her litigation history,
but the Missouri Supreme Court reversed. The court reasoned:
However, in light of advances in technology allowing greater ac-
cess to information that can inform a trial court about the past
litigation history of venire members, it is appropriate to place a
greater burden on the parties to bring such matters to the court's
attention at an earlier stage. Litigants should not be allowed to
wait until a verdict has been rendered to perform a Case.net search
.. when, in many instances, the search could have been done in
the final stages of jury selection or after the jury was selected but
prior to the jury being empanelled.75
In light of this, the court imposed a new affirmative duty on lawyers, holding
that "a party must use reasonable efforts to examine the litigation history of a
prospective juror on Case.net of those jurors selected but not empanelled and
present to the trial court any relevant information prior to trial."76
The Johnson standard was codified in Missouri Supreme Court Rule
69.025, which became effective January 1, 2011.77 It mandates background
internet searches on potential jurors, specifically Case.net searches of a po-
tential juror's litigation history.78 However, the first reported case interpret-
ing Rule 69.025 and the Johnson standard would soon raise more questions
about the scope and timing of such internet searches by trial counsel.
In Khoury v. ConAgra Foods, the plaintiffs brought suit against
ConAgra for personal injury and loss of consortium damages, claiming that
Elaine Khoury suffered from a lung disease, bronchiolitis obliterans, alleg-
edly caused by exposure to chemical vapors during her preparation and con-
71. Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551 (Mo. 2010).
72. Id. at 554.
73. Id. at 554-55.
74. Id. at 555.
75. Id. at 558-59.
76. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
77. Khoury v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 189, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
78. Id. at 192-93.
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sumption of ConAgra's microwave popcorn. 79 After a voir dire in which the
members of the venire panel were questioned about their prior litigation his-
tory, both sides conducted searches of Missouri's automated case record ser-
vice.80 The parties exercised both their peremptory strikes and their strikes
for cause, and a jury was empanelled.81 The next morning, ConAgra's coun-
sel brought to the court's attention that, separate and apart from litigation
history information, their internet research had uncovered Facebook postings
by one juror, Mr. Piedimonte, indicative of bias and intentional failure to
disclose information.82 Piedimonte, they said, was "a prolific poster for anti-
corporation, organic foods."83 ConAgra moved for a mistrial or, alternatively,
to strike Piedimonte from the jury.84 The court denied the motion for mistrial,
but did strike Piedimonte from the jury and proceeded with twelve jurors and
three (instead of four) alternate jurors.85 After a defense verdict, the Khourys
appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in removing
juror Piedimonte, maintaining that ConAgra's broader internet search was
not timely.86 The appellate court rejected this argument, observing that the
Johnson standard and the subsequent Supreme Court Rule 69.025 were lim-
ited to Case.net searches of potential juror's litigation history, not a broader
search for any alleged material nondisclosure.87 As the court pointed out:
The rule could have similarly required "reasonable investigation"
into other areas of "possible bias" and could have required such
"reasonable investigation" to include a search of Internet social
and business networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, or
Linkedin, to name a few. And, the rule could have similarly re-
quired "reasonable investigation" of potential jurors via Intemet
search engines such as Google or Yahoo!, to name a few. Or, the
rule could have simply required a blanket "Internet search" on
"any and all issues of prospective juror bias." But, clearly, it does
not.88
Although the appellate court limited itself to the plain text of the rule, it did
acknowledge the potential in the digital age for a revisiting of Rule 69.025,
stating that "the day may come that technological advances may compel our




83. Khoury, 368 S.W.3d at 193.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 199.
87. Id. at 202-03.
88. Id. at 203 n.12.
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Supreme Court to rethink the scope of required 'reasonable investigation'
into the background of jurors that may impact challenges to the veracity of
responses given in voir dire before the jury is empanelled ....
IV. JUDICIAL CONCERNS REGARDING ATTORNEY USE OF SOCIAL
MEDIA DURING VOIR DIRE
The trial judge in Carino v. Muenzen is by no means alone in his reser-
vations about attorneys performing online research on prospective jurors. In a
2013 state court criminal trial of a man accused of child sexual abuse, Mont-
gomery County (Maryland) Judge Richard Jorden banned such research dur-
ing voir dire, saying that it would discourage people from performing their
civil duty of reporting for jury duty.90 "There's a real potential for a chilling
effect on jury service, by jurors, to know 'I'm going to go out to the court-
house ... I'm going to be Googled. They're going to find all kinds of stuff
on me,' and it feels kind of uneasy, at least," said Judge Jordan.91
Federal judges have displayed similar reticence. In a May 2014 survey
of judges conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, 25.8 percent of the re-
spondents admitted that they banned attorneys from using social media dur-
ing voir dire (nearly 70 percent of the judges responded they never addressed
this issue with lawyers).92 When asked to explain why they didn't permit
attorneys to engage in such research, those judges who answered accordingly
pointed to both concerns for juror privacy and logistical considerations.93
Twenty percent of the judges wanted to protect juror privacy, while another
four percent were worried about jurors feeling intimidated.94 Another seven-
teen percent felt that allowing such research would be distracting, while six-
teen percent were concerned about the practice prolonging voir dire.95
Another third of the respondents considered such online research unneces-
sary, reasoning that attorneys could conduct it before court or that the infor-
mation provided during "regular" voir dire was sufficient.96 A small fraction
89. Khoury, 368 S.W.3d at 203 (emphasis added).
90. St. John Barned-Smith, Montgomery Judge Denies Internet Searches for Jury




92. MEGHAN DUNN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JURORS' AND ATTORNEYS' USE OF SO-
CIAL MEDIA DURING VOIR DIRE, TRIALS AND DELIBERATIONS: A REPORT TO





96. Id. at 13-14.
[Vol. XVII
Should Voir Dire Become Voir Google?
of the judges responding pointed to concerns with creating an unfair advan-
tage for one side as the basis for their opposition, while an even tinier frac-
tion cited the inability to verify the accuracy of the information gathered.97
With regard to the potential ethical dangers of attorneys engaging in
inappropriate use of such networking information gathering, only five per-
cent of the responding judges reported experiencing a problem with a law-
yer's conduct.98 According to the survey, this was limited to attorneys
following prospective jurors on Twitter.99 There were no reports of improper
"friending," pretexting, or other efforts to get past a would-be juror's privacy
settings.OO Of course, some judges' concerns may be specific to a particular
social networking platform. In one New York federal case, the judge, re-
sponding to a motion in limine, forbade attorneys from engaging in searching
jurors on Linkedln and other sites in which the account holder could receive
a notification as to who looked at his page, but allowed searches on other
sites. 101
In addition to actual cases that provide some measure of guidance, prec-
edential value, and judicial perspective on the efficiency of performing social
media research on jurors, the ethics opinions promulgated by various bar
associations and ethics bodies around the country have served as useful sup-
plements. New York has been more active than any other jurisdiction in this
regard.
V. ETHICS OPINIONS
On May 18, 2011, the New York County Lawyers Association Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics issued Formal Opinion 743, which considered not
only lawyer research online into prospective jurors, but also considered the
ramifications of New York Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5 and the investi-
gation of jurors during the ongoing trial.102 It divided its discussion into two
distinct phases: the pretrial phase in which there are only prospective, not
actual, jurors; and the evidentiary or deliberation phases of a trial.103 There
are common ethical concerns in both phases, including avoiding communica-
tions with the jurors and taking care not to engage in any misrepresentations
or act with deceit.104 However, as to the later phases, there is the additional
97. Id. at 14.
98. DUNN, supra note 92.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. United States v. Watts, 934 F. Supp. 2d 451, 494-95 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
102. NYCLA Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Formal Op. 743, 1 (2011).
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id. at 3.
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ethical concern of how a lawyer must react if he or she learns of jury
misconduct.105
In both phases, the Committee made it clear that "passive monitoring of
jurors such as viewing a publicly available blog or Facebook page," is per-
missible so long as the lawyer has no direct or indirect contact with jurors.106
Referencing not only the Johnson v. McCullough decision and the Carino v.
Muenzen holding, but also the New York State Bar Association's previous
Ethics Opinion 843 on accessing publicly available social networking pages
of witnesses or unrepresented parties, Opinion 743 analogized that purely
passive monitoring of jurors was comfortably within ethical bounds.107 How-
ever, the Committee ventures into a murkier area with its discussion of im-
permissible contact. The opinion cautions lawyers to "not act in any way by
which the juror becomes aware of the monitoring."108 Clearly, this would
include actual substantive communications, such as an attorney sending a
Facebook message to the juror. And, according to the Committee, other
"communications" typical of the digital age would be similarly proscribed:
"Significant ethical concerns would be raised by sending a 'friend request,'
attempting to connect via Linkedln.com, signing up for an RSS feed for a
juror's blog or 'following' a juror's Twitter account. We believe that such
contact would be impermissible communications with a juror."109
This approach is consistent with courts around the country that have
held that even such relatively minimal contacts, such as friend requests or
"pokes," constitute communications sufficient to constitute a violation of a
court's "no contact" order or restraining order.Il0 However, the Committee
goes even further in its concern about what might be categorized as indirect
content, such as the automatic notification sent by a site to its user alerting
him that a third party has viewed or accessed his profile.IIl As the Committee
opined, "[i]f a juror becomes aware of an attorney's efforts to see the juror's
profiles on websites, the contact may well consist of an impermissible com-
munication, as it might tend to influence the juror's conduct with respect to
the trial."112 This, of course, envisions the scenario at issue in the "Hustle"
mortgage fraud trial discussed earlier, in which a juror complained after he
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2-3.
107. Id.
108. NYCLA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 743, 2-3 (2011).
109. Id. at 3.
110. JOHN BROWNING, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO SOCIAL NETWORKING: UNDER-
STANDING SOCIAL MEDIA'S IMPACT ON THE LAW 46-47 (2010).
111. NYCLA Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Formal Op. 743, 2-3 (2011).
112. Id. at 3.
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received notification of his Linkedln profile being viewed by a member of
one of the defense teams."13
But does such a broad interpretation of "impermissible communication"
make sense, not just with regard to the functionality of existing technology
but of the features that future technologies may offer a user in terms of
alerts? The opinion refers specifically to Twitter's practice of messaging the
account holder that someone is now "following" him as well as Linkedln's
auto-communication feature that one's profile has been recently viewed, but
also states that it "is intended to apply to whatever technologies now exist or
may be developed that enable the account holder to learn the identity of a
visitor.""14 Nonetheless, is an auto-notification truly a "communication?"
And even if it is, it is generated automatically by the site itself. A terse,
automatically generated notification lacking any substantive content should
not reasonably be considered a "communication," and equally importantly, it
should not be treated as an impermissible communication by the attorney
because it is not sent consciously or otherwise by the attorney herself.
The second aspect of the Committee's ruling that merits further consid-
eration is its analysis of the obligation to report juror misconduct under Rule
3.5 (of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct as well as the ABA's
Model Rules). This rule provides that "[a] lawyer shall reveal promptly to the
court improper conduct by a member of a venire or a juror, or by another
toward a member of the venire or a juror or member of his or her family of
which the lawyer has knowledge."15 Taking note of the prevalence of online
misconduct by jurors, despite instructions prohibiting this behavior, the Com-
mittee held:
Any lawyer who learns of juror misconduct, such as substantial
violations of the court's instructions, is ethically bound to report
such misconduct to the court under RPC 3.5, and the lawyer
would violate RPC 3.5 if he or she learned of such misconduct yet
failed to notify the court. This is so even should the client notify
the lawyer that she does not wish the lawyer to comply with the
requirements of RPC 3.5.116
While the Committee acknowledged that a lawyer "has no ethical duty
to routinely monitor the web posting or Twitter musings of jurors," if he does
elect to do so he will be under a duty to "promptly notify the court of any
impropriety of which the lawyer becomes aware.""17 This duty takes prece-
dence over the lawyer's own duties to his client. As the opinion goes on to
point out, a lawyer who learns of juror's improper conduct "may not use this
113. See supra text accompanying note 6.
114. NYCLA Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Formal Op. 743, 3 n.2 (2011).
115. N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.5(d) (2009).
116. NYCLA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 743, 4 (2011).
117. Id.
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information to benefit the lawyer's client in settlement negotiations, or even
to inform the lawyer's settlement negotiations.",18 So, a lawyer who, while
monitoring a juror's online presence, learns of a juror venturing online in
violation of the court's instructions must bring this to the court's attention,
regardless of whether that online foray revealed something favorable to his
client's case. This is consistent with other courts' approach to the primacy of
the attorney's duty of candor to the tribunal.119
Following the New York County Lawyers Association, the Committee
on Professional Ethics for the New York City Bar Association issued its own
ethics opinion the following year.120 Citing cases like Johnson and Carino,
along with cases detailing the lawyers of juror online misconduct, the City's
Committee agreed with the earlier ethics opinion and held that an attorney
may conduct juror research using social media services and websites.12, And,
like the New York County Bar opinion, the New York City Bar opinion
made it clear that attorneys performing such research could not engage in
communication with a juror.122 However, this opinion proceeded to address
the broader issue of what exactly constitutes an impermissible, ex parte com-
munication with a juror.123
"Communication," the committee ruled, should be understood in its
broadest sense. This would include not only sending a specific, substantive
message, but also any notification to the other person being researched that
he or she has been the object of a lawyer's search. The paramount issue, in
the eyes of the Committee, is that the juror or potential juror not learn of the
attorney's actions. As the opinion states, "the central question an attorney
must answer before engaging in jury research on a particular site or using a
particular service is whether her actions will cause the juror to learn of the
research."124
The Committee went on to state:
If a juror were to (i) receive a "friend" request (or similar invita-
tion to share information on a social network site) as a result of an
118. Id.
119. See United States v. Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d 445, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(stating, "[a]n attorney's duty to inform the court about suspected juror miscon-
duct trumps all other professional obligations, including those owed a client.
Any reluctance to disclose this information-even if it might jeopardize a cli-
ent's position-cannot be squared with the duty of candor owed to the
tribunal.").
120. N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. Prof I Ethics, Formal Op. 2012-2 (2012), availa-
ble at 2012 WL 2304271.
121. Id. at *2-3.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *4.
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attorney's research, or (ii) otherwise to learn of the attorney's
viewing or attempted viewing of the juror's pages, posts, or com-
ments, that would constitute a prohibited communication if the
attorney was aware that her actions would cause the juror to re-
ceive such message or notification. We further conclude that the
same attempts to research the juror might constitute a prohibited
communication even if inadvertent or unintended.125
In other words, ignorance, or lack of familiarity with, a site's functions
will not be an excuse in committing such an ethical violation. This position is
consistent with the trend in cases around the country, as well as the relatively
recent requirement under the Rule 1.1 of the Model Rule of Professional
Conduct to be technologically conversant as part of providing competent rep-
resentation, and of holding attorneys to a higher standard as far as technology
is concerned.
The New York City Bar opinion reminds lawyers that "communication"
will be understood in its broadest sense, and urges them to be mindful of the
fact that a communication is "the process of bringing an idea, information or
knowledge to another's perception."26 And, like its New York County coun-
terpart, it discusses an attorney's obligation to reveal improper juror conduct
to the court.127 But it addresses other issues, such as the potential for decep-
tion or misrepresentation when researching jurors on social networking
sites.12 8 Noting Rule 8.4's prohibition on deception and misrepresentation,
the opinion states that-in the jury research context-attorneys may not mis-
represent their identities, associations, or memberships in order to access oth-
erwise unavailable information about a juror. 129 So, for example an attorney
"may not claim to be an alumnus of a school that she did not attend in order
to view a juror's personal webpage that is accessible only to members of a
certain alumni network."130 With the proliferation of specialized subgroups
on social networking sites (such as LinkedIn groups restricted to people in
particular specialty area or with a specific affiliation), this can be a valid
concern. Similarly, the opinion observes that a lawyer is forbidden from us-
ing a third party to do what he or she could not otherwise do.131 Accordingly,
just as other ethics opinions have held with regard to lawyers not being al-
lowed to use those working under their supervision (such as a paralegal) to
125. Id. at *2.
126. N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 2012-2 (2012), availa-
ble at 2012 WL 2304271.
127. Id. at *1.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *6.
131. Id.
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"friend" a witness or party under false pretenses, lawyers may not use third
parties to surreptitiously gain access to a juror's profile.
Another issued that troubled the New York City Bar's Committee is the
impact on jury service of lawyers using social media sites to research jurors.
Echoing the concerns of some judges who have banned this practice by law-
yers, the Committee admitted that "[i]t is conceivable that even jurors who
understand that many of their social networking posts and pages are public
may be discouraged from jury service by the knowledge that attomeys and
judges can and will conduct active research on them or learn of their on-
line-albeit public-social lives."132 But, the Committee pointed out, view-
ing a public posting is similar "to searching newspapers for letters or
columns written by potential jurors because in both cases the author intends
the writing to be for public consumption."133 The Committee also added that,
"[t]he potential juror is aware that her information and images are available
for public consumption."134 While some potential jurors might be "unsophis-
ticated in terms of setting their privacy modes or other website functional-
ity," the Committee concedes, that does not change the ethical posture for the
researching attorney. 35 In fact, the opinion states that "the Committee be-
lieves that jurors have a responsibility to take adequate precautions to protect
any information they intend to be private."136
These two ethics opinions are not the only source of guidance from the
New York Bar. In March 2014, the Commercial and Federal Litigation Sec-
tion of the New York State Bar Association issued a comprehensive set of
Social Media Ethics Guidelines.137 These guidelines address a variety of is-
sues impacting a practitioner's use of social media. Guidelines 5 A-E address
various aspects of "[r]esearching [s]ocial [m]edia [pirofiles or [p]osts of
[p]rospective and [s]itting [j]urors and [r]eporting [j]uror [m]isconduct."38
Relying on and citing the two New York ethics opinions, these Guidelines
reaffirm that: (1) lawyers may conduct social media research; (2) lawyers
may view a juror's social media website as long as there is no communica-
tion with the juror; (3) lawyers may not use deceit to view a juror's social
media profile; (4) lawyers may view or monitor the social media profile or
posts of a juror during trial, provided that there is no communication; and (5)
132. N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 2012-2, at *7 (2012),





137. Gregory K. Arenson et al., Social Media Ethics Guidelines of the Commercial
and Federal Litigation Section, N.Y. ST. BAR Ass'N COMM. PROF'L ETHICS,
Mar. 18, 2014, available at http://www.nysba.org/workarea/DownloadAsset.
aspx?id=47547.
138. Id. at 15.
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lawyers must promptly inform the court of possible juror misconduct the
lawyer discovers by viewing a sitting juror's online postings.139
These Guidelines, with their citations to earlier ethics opinions, as well
as specific provisions of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, are
quite useful. In addition, the Guidelines provide handy, practical pointers for
lawyers seeking not to be identified through LinkedIn when viewing a juror's
public Linkedln profile. They also raise an occasional unanswered question:
"Whether a lawyer may non-deceptively view a social media account that
from a prospective or sitting juror's view is putatively private, which the
lawyer has a right to view, such as an alumni social network where both the
lawyer and juror are members."140
Oregon was the next state to address the issue of "Facebooking the
jury," as the Oregon Bar Association Ethics Committee examined lawyer
investigation of the social networking profiles of jurors, witnesses, and op-
posing parties in Formal Opinon No. 2013-189.141 With respect to jurors,
Oregon's key holding followed its New York counterparts. Oregon affirmed
that lawyers may access a juror's publicly available social networking infor-
mation, but neither a lawyer nor her agent may send a request to a juror to
access non-public personal information on a social networking site.142 Ore-
gon, however, ventured into uncharted territory by further advising that Rule
8.4(a)(3), which prohibits deceitful conduct, will not automatically preclude
a lawyer from enlisting an agent to deceptively seek access to another per-
son's social networking profile. 143 It holds that while a lawyer "may not en-
gage in subterfuge designed to shield [her] identity from the person" whose
profile she is seeking to access, an exception exists.144 Oregon Rule 8.4(b)
(which has no analog in the ABA Model Rules) creates one exception per-
mitting lawyers "to advise clients and others about or to supervise lawful
covert activity in the investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or
constitutional rights, provided the lawyer's conduct is otherwise in compli-
ance with [other] Rules of Professional Conduct."145 Under such "limited in-
stances," the Oregon ethics authorities concluded that a lawyer "may advise
or supervise another's deception to access a person's nonpublic information
on a social networking website[ ]" as part of an investigation into unlawful
activity.146 Could this language be used to justify having a trial consultant,
investigator, or other agent pose as someone else or otherwise be deceptive in
139. Id. at 15-17.
140. Id. at 16.
141. Or. State Bar, Formal Op. 2013-189 (2013).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 581.
145. OR. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(b) (2015).
146. Or. State Bar, Formal Op. 2013-189, 582 (2013).
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order to gain access to a juror's privacy-restricted profile if there is a suspi-
cion of juror misconduct? While the language is vague by referring only to
"persons," the wiser course of action would be to adhere to the opinion's
earlier mandate: "a lawyer may not send a request to a juror to access non-
public personal information on a social networking website, nor may a law-
yer ask an agent to do so."147
In April 2014, the American Bar Association weighed in with Formal
Opinion 14-466, "Lawyer Reviewing Jurors' Internet Presence."148 Like the
New York and Oregon ethics opinions, Opinion 466 held that it is not unethi-
cal for a lawyer to review the internet presence of a juror or potential juror,
so long as the lawyer refrains from communicating, either directly or indi-
rectly, with the juror, and neither an applicable law nor a court order has
limited such review.149 Noting the strong public interest in identifying jurors
who might be tainted by improper bias or prejudice (a la Sluss), the ABA's
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility sought to bal-
ance this interest with the equally strong public policy in preventing jurors
from being approached ex parte by either the parties to a case or their
agents. 150 Formal Opinion 14-466 identifies three levels of attorney review of
a juror's internet presence:
(1) passive lawyer review of a juror's website or ESM (elec-
tronic social media) that is available without making an access
request where the juror is unaware that a website or ESM has been
reviewed;
(2) active lawyer review where the lawyer requests access to
the juror's [profile]; and
(3) passive lawyer review where the juror becomes aware
through a website or ESM feature of the identity of the
viewer[.]151
As with earlier state ethics opinions, the ABA Opinion concludes that
there is nothing ethically forbidden about passive review of a juror's public
online profile.152 Analogizing this to driving down a prospective juror's street
to see where he lives, the Opinion finds that "[t]he mere act of observing that
which is open to the public" does not constitute an act of communication.153
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Opinion states that level (2) (active
lawyer review where the lawyer requests access to the juror's profile) is ethi-
147. Id. at 578 n.2.
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cally prohibited, because it constitutes communication to a juror seeking in-
formation that he has not made public.154 Continuing with the previous
analogy, Opinion 14-466 considers this situation to be akin to "driving down
the juror's street, stopping the car, getting out, and asking the juror for per-
mission to look inside the juror's house because the lawyer cannot see
enough when just driving past."55
With regard to level (3), Opinion 14-466 departs from the New York
ethics opinions and holds that such auto-notifications do not amount to com-
munication to the juror.156 The Opinion says, "The fact that a juror or poten-
tial juror may become aware that the lawyer is reviewing his Internet
presence when a network setting notifies the juror of such review does not
constitute a communication from the lawyer in violation of Rule 3.5(b)."'157
Returning to its earlier analogy, the Opinion states that the site-not the law-
yer-is communicating with the juror, based on a purely technical feature of
the site itself.158 As the Opinion describes it, "[t]his is akin to a neighbor's
recognizing a lawyer's car driving down the juror's street and telling the
juror that the lawyer ha[s] been seen driving down the street."59
Despite this divergent view of what constitutes an impermissible "com-
munication," the ABA Opinion nevertheless has words of caution for lawyers
who review juror social media profiles. First, hearkening back to the new
standard of attorney competence that mandates being conversant in the bene-
fits and risks of technology, the Opinion reminds lawyers to be aware of
"these automatic, subscriber-notification features."160 Second, the Opinion
refers to Rule 4.4(a) on prohibiting lawyers from actions "that have no sub-
stantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third per-
son. ... 1"61 It admonishes lawyers reviewing juror social media profiles to
"ensure that their review is purposeful and not crafted to embarrass, delay, or
burden the juror or the proceeding."162
One other area of Opinion 14-466 marked a departure from earlier state
ethics opinions-the thorny issue of a lawyer's obligation to notify the court
of information gleaned through his social media research that indicates juror
misconduct. When the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission reviewed the Model
Rules that year and proposed changes, one was not carried out. For Model
Rule 3.3, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the Commission's recom-
154. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 14-466 (2014).
155. Id. at 5.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 5.
160. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 14-466, 5 (2014).
161. Id. at 6 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.4(a) (2002)).
162. Id.
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mendation for a new subsection (b), in which a lawyer's obligation to act
upon discovering "improper conduct" arises only when the juror or prospec-
tive juror engages in conduct that is "fraudulent or criminal."63 While the
Commission intended that this subsection also include lesser wrongdoing-
"improper conduct"-and thus impose a broader duty, this part was unfortu-
nately "never carried out."164 Because the ABA Committee only permitted
itself to be guided by the actual language of Rule 3.3(b), rather than the
intent reflected in its legislative history, Opinion 14-466 is not as broad. Rule
3.3(b) does not prescribe what a lawyer must do in the event he discovers
juror conduct that violates a court order, but that does not rise to the level of
criminal or fraudulent activity (such as a juror doing online research about
the case or discussing it on Twitter). Opinion 14-466 nonetheless tries to
provide guidance. It states that "applicable law might treat such juror activity
as conduct that triggers a lawyer's duty to take remedial action including, if
necessary, reporting the juror's conduct to the court under current Model
Rule 3.3(b)."165 As the Opinion points out, "The materiality of juror internet
communications to the integrity of the trial will likely be a consideration in
determining whether the juror has acted criminally or fraudulently."166 In
other words, it is not the lawyer's call to decide whether the juror misconduct
he discovers rises to the level of "criminal or fraudulent"; the lawyer's reme-
dial duty, according to Opinion 14-466, is triggered by knowledge of the
conduct itself, and "is not preempted by a lawyer's belief that the court will
not choose to address the conduct as a crime or fraud."167
When it was issued, Formal Opinion 14-466 received national publicity
and engendered some controversy, including criticism that it sanctioned the
wholesale invasion of juror privacy.168 But the very next state to consider the
issue of researching jurors using social media followed the ABA approach.
The Pennsylvania Bar Association, in early October 2014, issued Formal
Opinion 2014-300.169 Agreeing with every other jurisdiction to speak on the
issue, the Pennsylvania Bar concluded that lawyers may ethically use online
sites including social networking platforms to research jurors, so long as the
information was publicly available and doing so did not constitute an ex
163. Id. at 7.
164. Id. at 8.
165. Id.
166. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 14-466, 9 (2014).
167. Id.
168. See Editorial, A Troublesome Opinion Regarding Juror Internet Research,
CONN. LAW TRIBUNE, June 24, 2014 ("The combination of allowing lawyers to
do internet research on jurors and requiring the reporting of potential inconsis-
tencies has the potential to make jury selection more adversarial and less pleas-
ant for the citizens who are doing their civic duty.").
169. Pa. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014).
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parte communication.I7 0 The Pennsylvania Bar broke ranks with New York,
however, on the question of whether a passive notification sent by a site like
Linkedln to notify users that an individual has viewed their profile consti-
tutes an ex parte communication. The Committee agreed completely with
ABA Formal Opinion 14-466, explaining that "[t]here is no ex parte commu-
nication if the social networking website independently notifies users when
the page has been viewed."'7' Additionally, "a lawyer may be required to
notify the court of any evidence of juror misconduct the lawyer discovers on
a social networking website."172
VI. CONCLUSION
Given human nature and how some percentage of the population will
react when plucked from the anonymity of their personal lives by a jury
summons and subjected to probing questions by attorneys, it is inevitable that
some people will lie during voir dire. In some instances, the prospective juror
may be a so-called "stealth juror," someone with an agenda to serve who
desires to be on a particular jury due to the issues or individuals involved or
simply its high-profile nature. Such was the case with a juror dismissed from
the murder trial of New England Patriots player Aaron Hernandez, after it
was revealed that she had previously expressed interest in serving on that
jury and had lied during voir dire about how many Patriots games she had
attended.173 In other situations, the lying juror may be covering up past run-
ins with the law, including ones that could impact that juror's consideration
of issues in the case. For example, in the recent New Jersey trial of Travis
Hartsfield, Jr.-who was accused (and later convicted) of murdering his
twenty month-old daughter-juror Wacoa Stanford was indicted for perjury
for allegedly lying during jury selection about her criminal history and expe-
rience with New Jersey's Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS).174
Stanford allegedly lied about a disorderly conduct conviction, and had not





173. Lindsey Adler, Aaron Hernandez Juror Released for Lying About How Many
Patriots Games She's Attended, BUZZFEED (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.buzz
feed.com/lindseyadler/aaron-hernandez-juror-released-for-lying-about-how-
many-patr#.hoDRlGnAo (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
174. Bill Wichert, Former Juror Indicted for Lying During Trial of Man Convicted
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And given the pervasive nature of social networking communications in
an era in which seventy-four percent of adult Americans have at least one
social media profile, it is hardly surprising that some of the misconduct by
jurors occurs via social media platforms, and that social media profiles con-
tinue to yield information important to lawyers' jury selection considerations.
In the Akron, Ohio murder trial of Shaun Ford, Jr. in October 2014, one juror
was dismissed ten hours into deliberations over concerns about her Facebook
"friends" list.176 The juror, a paralegal, had a list of Facebook friends that
included the county prosecutor and other high-level members of the prosecu-
tor's office. Interestingly, it was the prosecution that brought this to light,
having researched her profile in detail during jury deliberations over con-
cerns that she might be the lone holdout. 177 While the juror acknowledged
being Facebook friends with many legal professionals due to the nature of
her job, she stated that her online friendships had not impacted her judgment
in the trial. Although the court denied a defense motion for a mistrial, it did
dismiss her and seated an alternate in her place.178
Jurors' online misconduct has been a persistent problem in courtrooms
nationwide.179 And despite revised jury instructions that specifically warn
against online investigation or communications about a case using social me-
dia, instances of tweets and Facebook posts causing mistrials, threatening to
overturn and overturning convictions, and resulting in increasingly stiff pun-
ishments for errant jurors continue to crop up. For example, Memphis, Ten-
nessee juror, Renita Scott, was found in contempt of court in February 2015
and sentenced to ten days in jail after she communicated with defendant,
Markelvious Moore, during his aggravated robbery trial.180 Scott acknowl-
edged that she and Moore were already Facebook friends before trial and that
she had communicated with him during deliberations before joining her fel-
low jurors in returning a guilty verdict. In another recent case, an Iowa appel-
late court overturned the murder conviction of Tyler Webster because a juror
had commented on or "liked" posts made by the mother of the victim, Buddy
176. Dave Nethers Juror in Murder Trial Sent Home Because of Facebook Friends




179. See, e.g., JOHN G. BROWNING, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO SOCIAL NETWORKING:
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL MEDIA'S IMPACT ON THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2010);
THADDEUS H. HOFFMEISTER, SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM: A NEW ERA
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE? 49-54 (2014).
180. Juror in Memphis Communicated with Defendant on Facebook, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.knoxnews.comlnews/state/juror-in-memphis-
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[Vol. XVII
Should Voir Dire Become Voir Google?
Frisbie.181 State v. Webster and its result underscores the importance of in-
quiring about prospective jurors' connections, including social media con-
tacts with parties and witnesses involved in a case and the need to conduct
such social media investigation.
After the defense rested, a court clerk and another court attendant ap-
proached the judge and expressed their surprise that the juror in question was
in fact serving on the jury because of her connection to the Frisbies.82 Dur-
ing a hearing on the defense's motion for a new trial, the juror acknowledged
being Facebook friends with both Frisbie's mother and sibling, and having
commented on Facebook about the case as well as having "liked" Facebook
posts by Frisbie's mother about the trial.183 Interestingly, when asked why
she had not disclosed her connection with the family, the juror pointed out
that the defense had simply not asked and that "I was going to say something
then [during jury selection], but I thought we had to wait to be asked specific
questions."84 Although the trial judge found that the juror's Facebook activ-
ity was "unnecessary, inappropriate, and inconsistent with the court's admo-
nitions," it denied the motion for a new trial. The Iowa Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded for a new trial.185 While the appellate court was not
persuaded that the juror's Facebook activities constituted misconduct war-
ranting a new trial, it did believe that it was sufficient evidence of juror bias.
The court held:
Due to her relationship with the victim's family, evidenced by her
own statements of her relationship with the family, her communi-
cation with the victim's mother before, during, and after trial, par-
ticularly in light of her daughter's close relationship with the
victim's family and Juror's "wish" the victim's mother had gotten
a first-degree murder conviction, we must conclude Juror could
not be impartial.186
Yet in other recent cases, the social media activity by jurors has not
been found to be grounds to overturn a conviction. In United States v. Liu, a
federal district court upheld the conviction of three defendants (two of whom
were lawyers) for immigration fraud, even though two different jurors
tweeted about the trial.187 One of the jurors, identified as "Juror 10," ac-
knowledged tweeting daily during trial, including the tweet "Add in just one
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song & dance number, and this federal case would rival anything I've seen
on #broadway, #jurydutyrocks."188 She was dismissed, with the court's ob-
servation that "her tweeting had been improper."189 Another juror (Juror 2)
who had admitted being an aspiring crime fiction writer during voir dire also
acknowledged her tweeting throughout the trial. Her tweets centered around
either frustration with the commitment of serving on a long jury trial, or
gaining potential ideas for future writing projects. The court rejected the de-
fense's argument that Juror 2 had failed to answer questions honestly about
her social media activity, noting that she "was never asked specifically
whether she had discussed the case with anyone on Twitter or other social
media."190 As to the defense's argument that this juror had ignored the
court's instructions, the court noted:
When the embrace of social media is ubiquitous, it cannot be sur-
prising that examples of jurors using platforms like Facebook and
Twitter "are legion" . . . Juror 2 was an attentive juror who, while
engaging in banter with fellow Twitter users about her experience,
was nonetheless careful never to discuss the substance of the case,
as instructed by the Court.191
And in a true case of irony, former Cameron County, Texas district
attorney Armando Villalobos-who himself had been an early proponent of
"Facebooking the jury," even issuing iPads to his prosecutors for the very
purpose of juror social media research-challenged his own criminal racke-
teering and extortion conviction on grounds of juror online misconduct. 92
The Fifth Circuit affirmed his conviction, finding that the pre-trial and trial
Facebook posts by the juror in question failed to show that the juror lied
during voir dire, betrayed a bias toward law enforcement, or engaged in juror
misconduct.'93
Researching the social media activity of prospective jurors and continu-
ing to monitor social media activity during trial can be vital to seating an
honest, unbiased jury, and to ensuring that any online misconduct is promptly
brought to the court's attention. The practice of such investigation has not
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has also been immortalized in pop culture in television courtroom dramas
like "The Good Wife" and "How to Get Away With Murder." It has become
an important tool in documenting juror misconduct,95 and the ready availa-
bility of juror research applications and affordable, user-friendly software has
leveled the playing field for solos and small firm attorneys who may not be
able to afford trial consultants.196 A greater understanding of the ethical
boundaries governing such research, however-on the part of not only law-
yers but the judiciary as well-is critical to ensuring that an already wide-
spread practice is properly conducted.
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